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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Aaron William Frandsen appeals from the judgment and sentences 
entered upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of 10 counts of lewd conduct 
with a minor under 16. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Frandsen sexually abused his biological daughter, A.F., in multiple ways, 
over multiple years, beginning when A.F. was just seven years old. (Tr., p.89, 
L.14 - p.127, L.19.) A grand jury indicted Frandsen on 10 counts of lewd 
conduct with a minor under 16. (R., pp.9-15.) Following a trial, a jury found 
Frandsen guilty as charged. (R., pp.196-98.) The district court entered 
judgment on the jury's verdicts and imposed concurrent unified sentences of life, 
with 25 years fixed. (R., pp.247-55.) Frandsen timely appealed. (R., pp.256-
60.) 
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ISSUES 
Frandsen states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it admitted irrelevant and 
highly prejudicial evidence over Mr. Frandsen's objection? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
upon Mr. Frandsen ten concurrent unified life sentences, 
each with twenty five years fixed, following his conviction for 
ten counts of lewd conduct of a minor under the age of 
sixteen? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Frandsen failed to demonstrate error in the district court's evidentiary 
ruling? 
2. Has Frandsen failed to establish that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing concurrent unified sentences of life, with 25 years 
fixed, upon Frandsen's convictions for 10 counts of lewd conduct with his 
biological daughter? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Frandsen Has Failed To Show Error In The Trial Court's Evidentiary Ruling 
A. Introduction 
Dr. Kathryn Reese is the medical director for CARES and examined A.F. 
after she disclosed that Frandsen had been sexually abusing her. (Tr., p.169, 
Ls.16-24, p.192, L.17 - p.193, L.10.) While testifying for the state at trial, Dr. 
Reese described, in general, the manner in which she performs a genital 
examination on a female child who alleges sexual abuse, including by having 
"the child lay back either in her mom's arms or on the table and have her spread 
her legs in what's called a frog leg position .... " (Tr., p.174, L.18-p.175, L.13.) 
To assist Dr. Reese in explaining to the jury what the "frog leg position" is, the 
state sought to admit, as State's Exhibit 1, a diagram, taken from a medical 
book, of a "woman holding a child and the child is in ... a frog leg position with 
her genitalia open for viewing." (Tr., p.175, L.14 - p.176, L.8; see also State's 
Exhibit 1.) Frandsen objected to the admission of the diagram, arguing: 
Well, Your Honor, I guess I would be more comfortable of 
[sic] an explanation of why this would be so helpful. I think we 
know the examination happened. She can testify from the report. I 
don't want the jury to be inflamed by anything portraying what may 
have happened in the case during the exam. 
(Tr., p.176, Ls.9-15.) In response, the prosecutor argued that using the proffered 
diagram "would be less inflammatory" than putting "the actual pictures of [A.F.'s] 
body up on the huge screen for everyone to see." (Tr., p.176, Ls.18-24.) The 
court then clarified, "The objection is that this document is inflammatory?" (Tr., 
p.176, L.25 - p.177, L.1.) Frandsen's attorney responded, "It is just one of the 
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pictures. I think one of the pictures is necessary. 111 The other picture showing 
the position, I don't think, is necessary." (Tr., p.177, Ls.2-5.) After clarifying the 
exhibit was simply a diagram from a medical book and not an actual photograph 
of AF., the district court admitted the exhibit over Frandsen's objection, ruling, "I 
don't find that that's inflammatory. I think it is certainly an aid to the jury in this 
case." (Tr., p.177, Ls.6-18.) 
On appeal, Frandsen argues the district court erred in admitting State's 
Exhibit 1, contending it was both irrelevant and "highly prejudicial." (Appellant's 
brief, pp.4-8.) Frandsen's arguments fail for a number of reasons. First, 
Frandsen did not raise a relevance objection below and, as such, the issue is not 
properly before this Court on appeal. Second, even assuming this Court deems 
Frandsen's relevance argument preserved, correct application of the law to the 
facts of this case shows the argument to be without merit. Third, Frandsen has 
failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the exhibit 
over Frandsen's objection that it was inflammatory. Finally, even assuming the 
court erred in admitting the exhibit, any such error was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved 
for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry. 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 
P.3d 961, 976 (2010). 
1 To further assist the jury in understanding Dr. Reese's testimony, the state also 
introduced, as State's Exhibit 2, a "standard diagram of a female genitalia." (Tr., 
p.180, L.3 - p.181, L.3; see also State's Exhibit 2.) That exhibit was admitted 
without objection. (Tr., p.180, L.17 - p.181, L.9.) 
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Relevance of evidence is reviewed de novo, but other questions of 
admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008); State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 
632, 945 P .2d 1, 3 (1997). In reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion, an 
appellate court determines whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the 
issue as one involving the exercise of discretion; (2) acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to specific choices it had; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221; State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 
37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Powell, 125 Idaho 889, 891, 
876 P.2d 587, 589 (1994)). 
C. Frandsen Failed To Preserve For Appeal His Claim That The Diagram 
Was Not Relevant 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the court below before an issue is preserved for 
appeal. The specific ground for the objection must also be clearly stated." State 
v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing I.R.E. 
103(a)(1 ); State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 940, 877 P.2d 905 (1994)). "For an 
objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific ground for the 
objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be apparent 
from the context." State v. Almaraz,_ Idaho_, 301 P.3d 242, 260 (2013) 
(quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003)); see 
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also I.RE. 103(a)(1). Objecting to the admission of evidence on one basis does 
not preserve a separate and different basis for exclusion of the evidence. State 
v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d 125 (1995); State v. Higgins, 122 
Idaho 590, 596, 836 P.2d 536 (1992); State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 871, 264 
P.3d 975, 978 (Ct. App. 2011); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 
76 (Ct. App. 2000); Gleason, 130 Idaho at 592, 944 P.2d at 727. 
At trial, defense counsel initially objected to the admission of State's 
Exhibit 1 on the stated basis that he "would be more comfortable of [sic] an 
explanation of why this would be so helpful" and he did not "want the jury to be 
inflamed by anything portraying what may have happened in the case during the 
exam." (Tr., p.176, Ls.10-15.) Responding to what it apparently believed to be 
the basis of Frandsen's objection, the state argued that showing the jury the 
diagram would be "less inflammatory" than "put[ting] the actual pictures of 
[A.F.'s) body up on the huge screen for everyone to see." (Tr., p.176, Ls.18-24.) 
The court then gave Frandsen the opportunity to clarify the basis of his objection, 
inquiring, 'The objection is that this document is inflammatory?" (Tr., p.176, L.25 
- p.177, L.1.) Frandsen's attorney responded to the request for clarification, not 
by asserting a relevance objection, but by asserting, "It is just one of the pictures. 
I think one of the pictures is necessary. The other picture showing the position, I 
don't think, is necessary." (Tr., p.177, Ls.2-5.) 
On appeal, Frandsen attempts to equate defense counsel's argument that 
the exhibit was not "necessary" with an assertion that it was "not necessary to 
determine either his guilt or innocence" - i.e., it was not relevant. (Appellant's 
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brief, pp.2, 4.) Frandsen's assertions on appeal notwithstanding, the context in 
which defense counsel made the objection does not support such a reading. 
There is no question that counsel never expressly invoked I.R.E. 401 or 
otherwise specifically characterized the diagram as not "relevant." Although 
counsel claimed the diagram "showing the position" was not "necessary" he 
appears in context to have been arguing it was not necessary because there was 
another "picture" that would suffice to illustrate Dr. Reese's testimony; and he 
made this assertion in direct response to the court's question whether the basis 
of the objection was that the exhibit was inflammatory. (Tr., p.176, L.25 - p.177, 
L.5.) Given this context, it appears counsel's objection was actually that the 
diagram was inflammatory because it was unnecessarily cumulative - not that 
the diagram had no relevance at all. 
Because Frandsen did not expressly state a relevance objection, and 
because no such objection is apparent from the context of counsel's argument, 
Frandsen failed to preserve for appeal the issue of whether State's Exhibit 1 was 
relevant. This Court should thus decline to consider the issue. 
D. Even If Preserved, Frandsen's Appellate Claim That The Diagram Was 
Not Relevant Fails; The Diagram Was Clearly Relevant For The Purpose 
Of Illustrating Dr. Reese's Testimony 
The state offered State's Exhibit 1 for the express purpose of "assist[ing]" 
Dr. Reese "in describing how [she) provide[s] a genital exam to a child who 
alleges sexual abuse." (Tr., p.176, Ls.2-8.) The district court admitted the 
exhibit over Frandsen's objection, finding it was not inflammatory and was 
"certainly an aid to the jury in this case." (Tr., p.177, Ls.10-13.) Frandsen 
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argues on appeal that the diagram was not directly relevant to the jury's 
determination of his guilt or innocence and, as such, was improperly admitted. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.4-6.) Even assuming Frandsen's relevance argument was 
preserved by way of a sufficiently specific objection below, it fails. The diagram 
was clearly relevant for the purpose for which it was offered - i.e., illustrating Dr. 
Reese's testimony- and was therefore properly admitted. 
It has long been the law in Idaho that, to be admissible, illustrative 
evidence need "only be relevant to the witness' testimony." State v. Stevens, 
146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 
758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993). Visual aids such as diagrams and videos 
are examples of illustrative exhibits and are properly admitted if they actually 
illustrate or explain the witness' testimony. See Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143-44, 
191 P .3d at 221-22 (video illustrating doctor's testimony regarding methods he 
used to determine whether child's injuries were result of fall was admissible to 
illustrate doctor's testimony, regardless of its accuracy); Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 
at 764, 864 P.2d at 602 (diagram of crime scene relevant to illustrate officer's 
testimony concerning details of his investigation). 
In this case, Dr. Reese testified without objection regarding the manner in 
which she performs genital examinations on female children alleging sexual 
abuse. (Tr., p.173, L.11 - p.175, L.13.) Specifically, the doctor testified that 
when performing such an exam, she is "looking for ... any signs of injuries such 
as tears or bruising" and, to do so, she has "the child lay back either in her 
mom's arms or on the table and have her spread her legs in what's called a frog 
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leg position so [she] can look at [the child's] genital region.''. (Tr., p.174, Ls.18-
21, p.175, Ls.10-13.) State's Exhibit 1 is a diagram that illustrated for the jury 
what the "frog leg position" is. (Tr., p.175, L.21 - p.1761; State' Exhibit 1.) 
According to Dr. Reese, the diagram was also helpful to "show that the child is 
not in any discomfort or pain from [the] exam" and to show how the physician is 
able to "view [the child's] vaginal area and her anal opening without any sign of 
distress or stretching." (Tr., p.178, Ls.7-14.) Because the diagram clearly aided 
Dr. Reese in her testimony by visually illustrating for the jury the manner in which 
she performs genital examinations, similar to that performed on A.F. in this case, 
the diagram was relevant and properly admitted for that purpose. 
E. The Diagram Was Not Unfairly Prejudicial 
Pursuant to I.RE. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice - which is the tendency 
to suggest a decision on an improper basis - substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 
720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. 
App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 
1993). "Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The rule suggests a 
strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence." State v. Martin, 118 
Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original). 
Below, Frandsen did not identify any specific prejudice from the admission 
of State's Exhibit 1, instead claiming in general terms that he did not "want the 
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jury to be inflamed by anything portraying what may have happened in the case 
during the exam." (Tr., p.176, Ls.13-15.) Expounding on this argument, 
Frandsen now claims the exhibit was "highly prejudicial" and inflammatory 
because, according to Frandsen, its only purpose "was to let the jury know that 
A.F. sat naked in the arms of an adult with her legs spread open, exposing her 
genitals to a stranger, Dr. Reese." (Appellant's brief, p.6; see also p.7 ("[T]his 
exhibit only focused the jury on the fact that A.F. got naked in front of multiple 
adults, while one adult held her legs open while the other adult examined her 
genitalia."); p.8 (the exhibit "is just creepy, has no probative value and was highly 
prejudicial as it would get the jury to think about A.F. in a compromised situation 
while Dr. Reese performed her examination").) Frandsen also claims the 
"inflammatory effect of the exhibit" was "exacerbated" by Dr. Reese's testimony 
that the "frog leg position" depicted in the diagram is only used with younger 
children, thus "evoking sympathy" for the young victim. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-
8.) 
To the extent Frandsen's arguments are merely a rehashing of his claim 
that the diagram had no probative value whatsoever, they fail for the reasons 
already set forth in Section D, supra - i.e., the diagram was illustrative of Dr. 
Reese's testimony. To the extent Frandsen argues the diagram encouraged the 
jury to render its guilty verdicts based on sympathy for A.F., rather than on the 
evidence showing that Frandsen repeatedly and protractedly committed lewd 
acts upon A.F., such claim finds no support in either the record or the applicable 
law. 
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There is no question that the diagram depicts a child sitting naked in the 
"frog leg position" on the lap of an adult. (See State's Exhibit 1) Contrary to 
Frandsen's assertions, however, the exhibit could not have "focused the jury on 
the fact that AF. got naked in front of multiple adults, while one adult held her 
legs open while the other adult examined her genitalia" (Appellant's brief, p.7) 
because, according to Dr. Reese's testimony, that is not the manner in which the 
doctor conducted the examination of AF. Dr. Reese testified that "[w]ith older 
children and with teenagers we have them on, just on a medical examining bed 
. . . . So they would be just lying on a bed in a position similar to [the frog leg 
position], but the parent would not be holding them there." (Tr., p.178, L.20 -
p.179, L.1.) A.F. was 12 years old when Dr. Reese examined her. (Tr., p.193, 
Ls.4-6.) Regarding AF.'s exam, specifically, the doctor testified she "had [AF.] 
lay on the bed" - not sit in the lap of an adult - for the genital examination. (Tr., 
p.200, Ls.12-23.) Moreover, as far as Dr. Reese's notes reflected, AF.'s mother 
was not even there. (Tr., p.193, L.24 - p.194, L.25.) Because the evidence 
showed AF. was not examined in the specific manner depicted in the diagram, 
Frandsen's claim that the diagram "focused the jury" on the "fact" that she was 
necessarily fails. 
Regarding Frandsen's more general claims - that the exhibit was "just 
creepy" and only served to evoke sympathy for AF. by demonstrating to the jury 
that she had to go through the examination at all, such claims also fail to 
demonstrate that the exhibit was unfairly prejudicial. The state agrees that, by its 
nature, the diagram depicts an unpleasant circumstance. That it does so, 
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however, does not mean it was not admissible. In criminal cases, relevant 
evidence is often prejudicial in the sense that it is unpleasant or, in some cases, 
even gruesome, but such does not mandate its exclusion from evidence. See, 
s.9.:., State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 853, 828 P.2d 879, 882 (1992) (fact that 
photographs depict the body of a victim and the wounds inflicted on the victim 
and may tend to excite the emotions of the jury does not mandate their exclusion 
from evidence); State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 402, 958 P.2d 22, 28 (Ct. App. 
1998) (same). Rather, the trial court must exercise its discretion by balancing 
the probative value of possibly inflammatory evidence against the risk of unfair 
prejudice. Winn, 121 Idaho at 853, 828 P.2d at 882. Here, the court exercised 
discretion in favor of admitting the diagram, finding it was "certainly an aid to the 
jury" and was not "inflammatory." (Tr., p.177, Ls.10-13.) The court was correct. 
State's Exhibit 1 is not an actual photograph or other graphic 
representation of a child in what Frandsen refers to as a "compromised 
situation." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) It is instead a rather simple and sterile black-
and-white drawing illustrating the "frog leg position" Dr. Reese referred to in her 
testimony. Although the subject-matter of the diagram is itself unpleasant, 
nothing about the diagram is so intensely graphic that it would have caused a 
juror to decide the case based on an emotional response to it. Nor did anything 
about the diagram pose more of a danger of evoking sympathy for A.F. than the 
unobjected to testimony Dr. Reese gave about exam procedure itself. In short, 
nothing about the exhibit was so prejudicial as to suggest a decision on improper 
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basis. Frandsen's arguments to the contrary are without merit and fail to show 
an abuse of discretion in the admission of the diagram. 
F. Any Error Was Harmless 
Even if Frandsen has met his burden of showing error in the admission of 
State's Exhibit 1, any such error is harmless. "Where a defendant alleges error 
at trial that he contemporaneously objected to, this Court reviews the error on 
appeal under the harmless error test." Almaraz, Idaho at , 301 P.3d at 
- -
258-259 (citation omitted). "[T]he error is harmless if the Court finds that the 
result would be the same without the error." Id. at_, 301 P.3d at 256 (citation 
omitted). 
Frandsen was charged with 10 counts of lewd conduct, committed with his 
biological daughter, A.F. (R., pp.9-15.) At trial, A.F. testified in excruciating 
detail to the many and varied acts of sexual misconduct Frandsen perpetrated 
against her over a period of four years, beginning when she was just seven years 
old. (Tr., p.89, L.14 - p.127, L.19.) Specifically, she testified that during that 
four-year period, Frandsen repeatedly touched her vagina, forced her to engage 
in oral sex, and vaginally and anally raped her. (Id; see also Tr., p.288, Ls.14-28 
(court noting at sentencing that "conduct occurred over a period of four years" 
and "involv[ed] virtually every type of lewd and lascivious conduct that there can 
be as defined under this statute").) Although Frandsen took the stand and 
denied the allegations (see Tr., p.216, L.13 - p.237, L.11 ), even he admitted, 
after trial, that A.F.'s testimony was "compelling" and that "[e]ven [he] wanted to 
take [himself] outside and kick [his] own ass." (PSE, p.6; Tr., p.292, Ls.9-13.) 
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A.F.'s testimony was also corroborated to some extent by the results of her 
physical examination, which showed evidence of vaginal penetration. (Tr., 
p.201, L.2 - p.202, L.24, p.207, Ls.6-12.) 
Given the compelling nature of A.F.'s testimony and evidence that tended 
to corroborate it, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict would 
have been different had State's Exhibit 1 not been admitted. If there was error, it 
was harmless. 
11. 
Frandsen Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Frandsen argues the concurrent unified sentences of life, with 25 years 
fixed, imposed upon his convictions for 10 counts of lewd conduct with his 
biological daughter are excessive in light of factors he claims are mitigating, 
including his "turbulent childhood," his failure to benefit from treatment 
associated with his prior adjudicated sex offenses, his military service and his 
ability to maintain employment. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-10.) Frandsen has failed 
to show an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. & 
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C. Frandsen Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kl 
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards 
applicable to its sentencing decision and set forth in thoughtful and exhaustive 
detail its reasons for imposing concurrent unified sentences of life, with 25 years 
fixed. (Tr., p.275, L.1 - p.296, L.14.) The court recognized the factors Frandsen 
claims are mitigating but determined the sentence was necessary in light of the 
egregious nature of the offenses, Frandsen's complete failure to accept 
responsibility for his actions, his history of prior sex offenses with family 
members, and the psychosexual evaluator's determination that Frandsen poses 
a medium-high to high risk to sexually reoffend. (Id.) The state submits that 
Frandsen has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully 
set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing (Appendix A), which 
the state adopts as its argument on appeal. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Frandsen's judgment 
and sentences. 
DATED this 10th day of October 2013. 
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Appendix A 
1 address the court. You're not required to do so. Do 
2 you wish to make a statement, sir? 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do. 
4 THE COURT: Please, go ahead. 
5 THE DEFENDANT: What I would like to say, Your 
6 Honor, is that, you know, on April 5th I had the right 
7 of a jury trial. I lost it. It's been my experience 
8 that when something like that happens, I don't agree 
9 with the conclusion of the jury, what the jury did, but 
10 what the jury's verdict was is what the jury's verdict 
11 was. So I have to do what I have to do. I have to do 
12 what's required of me. 
13 See, prior, even prior to when these 
14 allegations came out in December of 2010, I knew there 
15 was something wrong with my daughter. I tried to get 
16 her - I didn't know what it was, you know. And I 
17 guess the ultimate irony is that the actions I was 
18 taking to try to help my daughter is ultimately what 
19 led me here. You know, I guess I'm the cause of it. 
20 That's where I need to be. 
21 I would only ask, Your Honor, that I think 
22 I have demonstrated that I, you know -- excuse me. I'm 
23 trying to do what's right for not only my children, for 
24 Alex, for my ex-wife, you know, I just- I have 
25 children. I need to get back to be able to support 
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1 THE COURT: Sentencing is a matter of discretion 
2 for this court. I think it's important to note that in 
3 exercising that discretion I have to act within the 
4 bounds of law, and I have to consider the appropriate 
5 factors that are authorized by law in making the 
6 sentencing decision. Those factors, in my view, are the 
7 elements set forth in Idaho Code Section 19-2521, the 
8 reasons given by our legislature for a court imposing a 
9 sentence of probation versus those reasons for the court 
10 imposing a sentence of incarceration. 
11 Balanced against that statutory scheme is 
12 what I consider the case law factors outlined by our 
13 appellate courts in Idaho as to the policy reasons for 
14 decisions in sentencing. That being: First, concepts 
15 of rehabilitation to the defendant; concepts of 
16 deterrence, meaning that the court's sentence should 
17 send a message both to the defendant as well as to 
18 society at large; third, the concepts of retribution, 
19 which means punishment simply for punishment sake; last, 
20 what I think everyone recognizes as the controlling law 
21 in Idaho is that a sentence should be imposed taking 
22 into consideration the good order and protection of 
23 society. 
24 In fashioning a sentence in this case, I 
25 have considered all of those factors. I do intend to 
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1 them. I realize the chances are i'ii never be abie to 
2 see them again, but right now they're struggling, and as 
3 their father, that is something that, I mean, it's 
4 something that I need to rectify as best as I can. You 
5 know, so that's all that I would ask, Your Honor, is 
6 that I be given the chance eventually to be able to get 
7 something going again. 
8 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
9 Mr. Beus, is there any reason, legal in 
1 O nature, why sentence should not be imposed today? 
11 MR. BEUS: No, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Let me begin by noting that the 
13 victim in this case during the course of Mr. Frandsen's 
14 statements bolted out of the courtroom so she is not 
15 sitting here listening to my remarks. I guess that's 
16 her decision to make if she doesn't want to sit through 
17 these court proceedings, but I note that she does have 
18 the right to be here as the victim in this case. 
19 The factors that - and the victim has now 
20 returned to court. Ma'am, either stay in here or not 
21 stay in here as you wish. 
22 THE VICTIM: I'm sorry. 
23 THE COURT: But let's not make a show out of 
24 this. 
25 THE VICTIM: Okay. 
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1 discuss virtually every one of these in the statute 
2 today. The record should reflect that if I miss one or 
3 two in my comments I'm very familiar with this code 
4 section and it is my intention to have considered all of 
5 the factors authorized by Idaho law. 
6 With that explanation, let me start in this 
7 fashion. First, Mr. Frandsen, as to the jury's verdict 
8 in this case, I do find that they, in fact, found you 
9 guilty of ten counts, and that verdict, of course, has 
10 been entered in this case and you stand convicted of 
11 ten counts of lewd and lascivious conduct that occurred 
12 between 2006 and 2010, roughly a four-year span. These 
13 counts are self-explanatory in not only the jury's 
14 verdict, but in the Indictment in this case. They 
15 include, as Madam Prosecutor has stated, virtually 
16 every type of lewd and lascivious conduct that an adult 
17 could commit upon a minor child, everything from --
18 well, I'll just leave it at that. 
19 I mention that because this case is not a 
20 situation of an isolated incident. It's not a situation 
21 of one act. It's a situation of, as Madam Prosecutor 
22 said, multiple acts over multiple periods of time, 
23 under multiple circumstances. And, ultimately, as we 
24 know, over the history of the life of this defendant 
25 it's a situation where there have been multiple 
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1 minor things, but I'm not concerned about those. But in 1 focusing upon that factor in this case as being 
2 terms of prior delinquency in terms of sexual activity, 2 significant as to that particular child. 
3 there is no question in my mind that this defendant has 3 Is the defendant's criminal conduct the 
4 had a lifetime history of criminal activity in the 4 result of circumstances unlikely to recur? I look at 
5 sexual realm. 5 at least two things. Number one, I look at the history 
6 Frankly, when I read this psychosexual 6 of this man. Common sense tells me that one of the 
7 evaluation and found out, and the presentence report, 7 best indicators of where you're going to be tomorrow is 
8 and found out about the history of the admitted sexual 8 where you've been in the past. People do change in 
9 contact between the defendant and his two sisters at 9 life. People make mistakes in life. We all make 
10 the ages of both them and himself, and the reports are 10 mistakes. Sometimes we learn from those mistakes. 
11 clear about the ages so I don't need to read that all 11 Sometimes we don't. What is particularly troubling to 
12 in the record, and even the cousin, I was somewhat 12 this court is that we have a man who is 35 years of age 
13 shocked because I have a hard time understanding how a 13 who is engaging in inappropriate sexual contact with a 
14 defendant at ages five to 11 could have been involved 14 minor and that he's had this history of this since he 
15 in vaginal intercourse, fondling and cunnilingus with a 15 was literally a child himself. That would certainly 
16 child ages three to nine, with the same type of similar 16 indicate to me that the chances of future recurrence is 
17 conduct with the other sister and similar conduct, 17 significant. 
18 though it may be -- it's different, but it's still 18 The other factor I look at is the 
19 lewd and lascivious conduct for the cousin. 19 psychosexual evaluation in this case. Now, number one, 
20 For purposes of the record, Mr. Beus, I 20 this evaluation I think was thorough. I think it was 
21 recognize there is a great dispute over the conduct 21 well done, I think, in terms of the testing, the 
22 with the male in this case. I don't place a lot of 22 evaluations that were used and so forth. I fully 
23 reliance upon that and I will -- it's there. I'm not 23 recognize that things such as the Static and the RRASOR 
24 going to strike it from the reports, but I don't think 24 tests can certainly lead to wrong conclusions because 
25 that - I will say for this record that I am not 25 they are basically scored. In other words, if you 
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1 commit X, that gives you one point. If you commit Y, 1 with regard to his amenability to treatment in the 
2 you get two points, and so forth. Sometimes that 2 mental health evaluation that is part of this record, 
3 becomes rather callous in terms of those evaluations 3 but I think that is a far cry from treatment in the 
4 and I understand that. I also understand the defense's 4 sexual field. 
5 argument that by relying on the prior male victim issue 5 If there are other factors that the court 
6 that that skews the results of those tests. 6 should be looking at as to the likeliness or 
7 On the other hand, we also have something 7 unlikeliness of reoccurrence, I don't know what they 
8 called the Sexual Violence Risk Evaluation -- and these 8 are because I don't see them in this record in any 
9 are all evaluations that are approved by professionals 9 event. 
10 in the field and that's why we have these evaluations 10 What is the character and attitude of the 
11 completed -- with 20 risk factors that are involved. 11 defendant with regard to indicating that the commission 
12 And the report doesn't list out what the 11 of those 20 12 of another crime is likely or unlikely? That goes to 
13 risk factors were. I presume it probably includes some 13 the heart of the problem in sexual offenses. The 
14 of those that were included in the other two tests. I 14 evaluator in this case has clearly stated that this 
15 don't know that for sure, but, nevertheless, the 15 defendant has no remorse. He has no acceptance of 
16 results of that evaluation indicate that there is 16 responsibility. 
17 still a high risk to re-offend sexually from this 17 I've looked at the polygraph. It is, as 
18 defendant. 18 Mr. Beus has correctly said, I think, inconclusive. I, 
19 A third thing that I could look at, if I 19 frankly, had never seen a polygraph use that kind of a 
20 had the information available, is what a person has 20 statement before. I read it and I re-read it and I 
21 done during the course of the case or during the course 21 re-read it thinking what am I missing here? The 
22 of investigation or even after conviction to demonstrate 22 evaluator seems to say there is an indication of 
23 an amenability to treatment. I have zero information 23 deception, but I'm not going to make any opinions about 
24 in this case as to Mr. Frandsen's amenability to 24 that. For purposes of this record, I am going to 
25 treatment as to sexual offenses. I have information 25 totally disregard the polygraph because I don't think 
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1 it's helpful to anybody, and l don't think the 1 involving younger children again, given your situation 
2 psychosexual evaluator placed any undue reliance on 2 in life, I think it's just a question of time before 
3 that in any event. 3 there's a re-offense. 
4 The factors that deal with imprisonment are 4 Is the defendant in need of correctional 
5 these: 5 treatment that could be provided most effectively by 
6 Is there an undue risk that during a period 6 his commitment to an institution? In that regard I 
7 of a suspended sentence the defendant will commit 7 look strongly at the recommendations in the psychosexual 
8 another crime? I have to conclude in this case, 8 evaluation. Page seven of that report says this, 
9 Mr. Frandsen that there is an undue risk, or at least a 9 quote, "Mr. Frandsen is not amenable to community 
10 risk that I'm not comfortable accepting that you would, 10 treatment. He has not taken responsibility for these 
11 during a period of probation if the court were to 11 crimes, has minimized his past sexual offenses, and 
12 consider that, make it likely that you would commit 12 shows no remorse for the harm he has caused his 
13 another sexual offense because that's your whole history 13 victims," unquote. 
14 in life. I just don't have any other evidence to 14 One of the difficulties for a defendant in 
15 convince me otherwise. 15 a case like this that goes to trial where a defendant 
16 I always ask myself in these cases, if I 16 maintains his innocence is that he's in the proverbial 
17 were to put this defendant on probation today, could I 17 catch 22 position. Certainly, Mr. Frandsen had the 
18 go home tonight and sleep well knowing that society is 18 right to go to trial in this case and. there's nothing 
19 protected and have a good feeling in my stomach, so to 19 about that process that I in any way hold against him 
20 speak, that this type of conduct would not occur again? 20 and the record needs to be crystal clear about that. 
21 If I get that feeling, then I'll put somebody on 21 But, when you have a defendant who in the face of a 
22 probation. If I don't think that, then I'm going to put 22 community verdict of 12 persons in this community, in 
23 them in the penitentiary. Unfortunately for you, I 23 the face of what I thought was Clear evidence of ten 
24 reach the second conclusion in this case, and I have no 24 counts of lewd and lascivious conduct because, frankly, 
25 confidence that you would not, if placed in a situation 25 Mr. Frandsen, I would have convicted you too. Frankly, 
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1 you would have convicted yourself. You said that as 1 lascivious conduct that you should put somebody in the 
2 much in your reports that when you heard that testimony 2 penitentiary for life because that's what the 
3 you would have convicted yourself. I think what that 3 legislature sets as a maximum. I don't subscribe to 
4 does is it puts you into a very difficult position. 4 that theory. I believe that you have to look at each 
5 Certainly, you are certainly free to 5 individual case. You have to look at the nature of the 
6 maintain that position, but in terms of my knowledge of 6 case. You have to look at the particular types of 
7 how to deal with sexual offenders, once you take that 7 conduct involved because as we all know, those of us in 
8 position and you are not accepting any responsibility 8 the system know, you see all levels of lewd and 
9 for what's occurred here, I think it virtually means 9 lascivious cases. Those from what I call the grandpa 
10 that you are not amenable to treatment and you continue 10 touching cases, to the cases involving the, you know, 
11 to be a risk. I think that's exactly what the 11 the 20-year-old and the 15-year-old, to the ones that 
12 psychosexual evaluator is saying in this case, though, 12 are the more extreme cases, which is what we have in 
13 she didn't say it in those exact words. 13 this case which I consider to be a very aggravated type 
14 Will a lesser sentence depreciate the 14 of lewd and lascivious conduct. 
15 seriousness of the defendant's crime? When I look at 15 This conduct occurred over a period of four 
16 lewd and lascivious cases, l recognize that the 16 years, and as I said earlier, involves virtually every 
17 legislature of this state have placed this crime as one 17 type of lewd and lascivious conduct that there can be 
18 of the most significant crimes in terms of potential 18 as defined under this statute. This puts this case at 
19 punishment that we have. It ranks up there with murder, 19 the far extreme end of seriousness as far as this court 
20 robberies, certain types of drug offenses which are not 20 is concerned. iherefore, I think it is appropriate 
21 relevant here, but there are not very many crimes that 21 that the sentence in this case has to reflect that. 
22 carry a potential life sentence. 22 Will imprisonment provide appropriate 
23 It certainly is easy for one to start 23 punishment and deterrence to the defendant? That, as 
24 through the thinking process of saying, well, just 24 well as the next factor, which is appropriate deterrence 
25, because somebody has been convicted of lewd and 25 to other persons in the community, is always an issue 
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1 that I wrestle with in any criminal case. If sentences 1 of what I said earlier about this defendant's juveniie 
2 were to provide true deterrence to the public, we would 2 record, we certainly do have that present here. 
3 never be sitting here in this case because people would 3 He's also a multiple offender simply because 
4 recognize that if they didn't want to go to the 4 of the number of counts that he's been convicted of in 
5 penitentiary for a long period of time they wouldn't 5 this case. It may be that there is only one victim, but 
6 commit these offenses to begin with. 6 certainly multiple counts make him a multiple offender 
7 But, there is certainly a societal value, 7 and I take that into consideration here. 
8 if you will, in a sentence that's imposed. When the 8 The state says that Mr. Frandsen has an 
9 public reads that a court system imposes light 9 antisocial personality disorder. The psychosexual 
10 punishment for serious crimes, it certainly skews the 10 evaluation reaches that conclusion. The evaluation of 
11 world's view of how our legal system works. So there 11 Mr. Jones, the mental health evaluator who conducted an 
12 is an element of deterrence that comes from it in that 12 evaluation last year doesn't seem to reach that 
13 sense. 13 conclusion. The court is mindful that these become 
14 In terms of particular deterrence to this 14 opinions of evaluators. Different evaluators are going 
15 defendant, I don't know what a significant sentence 15 to reach different conclusions based upon how they want 
16 would do. It's probably one of these factors I put at 16 to interpret what they see. 
17 the lowest end of the policy factors that I'm 17 I don't know whether Mr. Frandsen is a 
18 considering. 18 true, has a true antisocial personality disorder, but I 
19 Is the defendant a multiple offender or 19 do believe that he has attributes of that. And as the 
20 professional criminal? I've always interpreted this 20 evaluator and Dr. Tyson stated, it appears that he has 
21 statute to mean this: that if you have a defendant who 21 a long-term pattern of manipulating, exploiting or 
22 has been convicted of multiple felonies, then they 22 violating the rights of others. At least in that 
23 became a multiple offender or professional criminal. 23 definition, I think that is true in this case. The 
24 But it also involves what we have in this case, multiple 24 manipulation that occurred with regard to his daughter 
25 offenders in terms of victims. In this case, because 25 in this case certainly places him in that category. 
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1 Has Mr. Frandsen done some good things in 1 outside in terms of the way they exist in society 
2 life? Yes, he has. He's been employed for periods of 2 doesn't tell me much about what their true attitude 
3 time. He's served our country. He's provided support 3 and views of life are with regard to violation of 
4 for his family from time to time. Obviously I don't 4 children's rights. 
5 expect him to be able to do that now since he's 5 Both the presentence investigation report 
6 incarcerated. So it is not a question that we have an 6 and the psychosexual report speak of certain statements 
7 individual here who has not provided anything 7 that this defendant has made during the course of the 
8 productive in this community. I won't go that far, and 8 presentence investigation and the evaluation process. 
9 I recognize that he certainly has some positive things 9 I'm looking particularly at page six of the psychosexual 
10 in his life. 10 report because I think it repeats some of the same 
11 Does he abide by court orders? I think he 11 things that the PSI report says. He stated, quote, 
12 does in terms of release and so forth. Do those things 12 "Her testimony was very compelling. Even I wanted to 
13 outweigh the conduct that has occurred in this case? 13 take myself outside and kick my own ass," unquote. An 
14 Clearly not, in my view. You know, the fact of the 14 interesting view of a victim's testimony. 
15 matter is that, and I think this is what Mrs. Craig was 15 "When asked directly if he abused his 
16 alluding to in her opening remarks at sentencing, is 16 daughter, the defendant stated, quote, 'I'm saying I do 
17 that sexual offenses involving children are, 17 not remember it happening,"' unquote. That is an 
18 unfortunately, committed by people that look like they 18 interesting statement. If that statement really means 
19 are just normal people living in our society. This 19 what it says on its face, that I do not remember having 
20 crime is the undisclosed one. 20 multiple acts of sexual activity with my daughter over 
21 I can't tell you the number of times that I 21 the course of four years, then we have a man here who 
22 have seen people that look like they fit the normal 22 has the most significant mental defect that I've ever 
23 profile of just a normal American person who has been 23 seen from somebody that's been before this court 
24 engaged in manipulation and violation of children. So 24 before. If it means I don't remember each and every 
25 the fact of just looking at what somebody does on the 25 incident, that's understandable. But, and this is his 
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1 words, "I do not remember it happening." If that's a 1 This is not a probation case by any means. 
2 statement of simply I deny that I did it, then I 2 It's not a retained jurisdiction case by any means. 
3 understand what that statement means, but it is of 3 The only question in my mind, as I sit here now and as 
4 concern to me. 4 I have a sat and listened to this case from the time 
5 "When asked if he suffered a condition 5 you were convicted through the sentencing process, is 
6 that at any time would compromise his memory, he stated 6 whether or not you should ever see the light of day 
7 no. When pressed further on the issue of the abuse, he 7 again. 
8 stated, quote, 'It didn't happen,"' unquote. Again, 8 The state has not asked for a fixed life 
9 that goes back to what I said earlier is that we have a 9 sentence in this case. I thought they were doing that 
10 defendant here who has gone to trial. He's testified, 10 at the outset, Ms. Craig, but I don't think that's what 
11 "I didn't do it." He's been convicted and he's now 11 you're asking for now. I don't think that a fixed life 
12 placed in that catch 22 situation where he's probably 12 sentence in this case would be appropriate because 
13 not going to admit that he did it. 13 under the law, as I understand it, I have to be 
14 The most significant thing that I think 14 convinced that there is no possibility of rehabilitation 
15 that the defendant has said in this case which affects 15 for a defendant. Though I have great concerns about 
16 my decision for sentencing in this case is the next 16 this defendant's ability to be rehabilitated, I cannot 
17 statement. "When asked to share his feelings regarding 17 make the conclusion that he could never be rehabilitated 
18 the crimes he was convicted of, he stated, quote, 'My 18 and I think that's the criteria for a fixed life 
19 thought is that if he - that if somebody does that, 19 sentence. 
20 they should be taken into the alley and be shot. It's 20 On the other hand, I do have concerns that 
21 reprehensible,"' unquote. 21 the good order and protection of society mandates a 
22 Mr. Frandsen, I can't take you into the 22 significant penitentiary sentence in this case and that 
23 alley and shoot you, nor would I do that. That would 23 you need to be supervised by law enforcement for the 
24 certainly not be appropriate. What I can do is put you 24 rest of your natural life. That is why I am going to 
25 in the penitentiary for a long period of time. 25 impose a unified life sentence in this case. 
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1 The question then is, how much of that 1 I am going to accept the state's recommendation in this 
2 should be fixed? It is, with any sentencing process, a 2 case and impose a 25-year fixed part of this unified 
3 combination of considering the seriousness of the 3 life sentence. 
4 offense, the nature of the offense, the need for what I 4 I will decline to order restitution in this 
5 call age development in a defendant so that he or she 5 case, Madam Prosecutor, even though I think it is owed 
6 outgrows the conduct that gets them into the criminal 6 because I think it is a futile act and I think it is 
7 system. I think that there's significant evidence that 7 simply -- well, it's a futile act and I decline to do 
8 as people get older their likelihood of re-offense 8 that. I will decline also to impose court costs in 
9 decreases. Where that line is changes with everybody. 9 this case or public defender reimbursement given the 
10 I don't have statistics that answer that question, nor 10 length account of this penitentiary sentence. 
11 do I have an opinion in this case as to what amount of 11 So it is clear for the record, this is a 
12 time is necessary in the penitentiary before that risk 12 unified sentence of life in the Idaho State 
13 factor goes away, but I know it's some period of time 13 Penitentiary, 25 years fixed, life indeterminate to be 
14 in this case. 14 served. 
15 What really drives me in this case, 15 You have the right to appeal this decision, 
16 Mr. Frandsen, is what I've said already. This, in my 16 as well as all decisions of this court and the jury in 
17 view, is an aggravated and a very aggravated lewd and 17 this case, Mr. Frandsen. You must perfect that appeal 
18 lascivious case. It's more than one count of Land L. 18 within 42 days of today. If you wish to do that, 
19 It's more than one count of just touching. As I said, 19 notify Mr. Beus and he will do that for you. 
20 it involves each and every type of lewd and lascivious 20 You'll be remanded to the custody of the 
21 conduct that can be prosecuted by the state in these 21 sheriff for transport to the penitentiary system to 
22 cases. I think the good order and protection of society 22 commence serving this sentence. 
23 requires a significant punishment component in this 23 The court is in recess. 
24 case, as well as a significant component to keep you out 24 (Court recessed at 3:55 p.m.) 
25 of society for a long period of time. For that reason, 25 
295 296 
